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Recent empirical findings suggest that alcohol dependence is characterized by
heightened sensitivity to unfairness during social transactions. The present study went a
step further and aimed to ascertain whether this abnormal level of sensitivity to unfairness
is underlined by an increased emotional reactivity. Twenty-six recently abstinent alcohol-
dependent (AD) individuals and 32 controls performed an ultimatum game (UG), in
which participants had to respond to take-it-or-leave-it offers, ranging from fair to
unfair and made by a fictive proposer. Emotional state was recorded during UG offers
presentation and was indexed by the amplitude of skin conductance response (SCR).
Results showed that AD decided to reject unfair offers more frequently than their controls,
confirming previous data. The proportion of rejected unfair UG offers was correlated
with SCR, in the AD but not in the control group. This finding suggests that deciding
to accept or reject unfair UG offers is influenced by arousal-affective activity in AD,
but not in controls. Heightened emotional reactivity may have driven AD to punish the
proposer rather than acting as a rational economic agent. An implication of present
findings is that AD might have difficult to cope with unfair situations triggered by social
interactions. Future studies are needed in order to examine whether—emotional and
behavioral—reactivity to unfairness during the UG could impact alcohol consumption and
relapse in AD.
Keywords: alcohol dependence, social decision-making, unfairness, electrodermal response
Introduction
Alcohol-dependent (AD) individuals persevere in alcohol use despite encountering long-term
aversive consequences directly linked to their drinking (Noël et al., 2010; American Psychiatric
Association, 2013; Camchong et al., 2014). The persistence of such maladaptive habits might be
underlined by poor decision-making ability. Indeed, abnormal profiles of decision-making have been
repeatedly evidenced in laboratory settings, wherein recently detoxified AD exhibited preference
toward short-term uncertain reward over safer long-term reward (Noël et al., 2007; Kornreich et al.,
2013; Brevers et al., 2014). Hence, one could infer that the occurrence of such impaired decision-
making processes might hamper ADs’ ability to exert willpower, that is, to decide based on both
short-term and long-term consequences of an action (Bechara, 2005; Noël et al., 2010).
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One limitation of these studies is that they focus on situations
where decision outcomes only affect the deciding agent. Hence,
those findings cannot be generalized to situations that involve
social interactions, that is, social decision-making that affects
others as well as the individual who makes the choice (Fehr
and Camerer, 2007; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). Abnormal social
decision-making has been evidenced in alcohol dependence
through the use of “moral dilemmas,” which trigger a conflict
between what is good for the majority (utilitarian judgment) and
emotional factors (Greene et al., 2001). Compared to healthy
controls, AD would be more prone to choose the rational options
(i.e., utilitarian moral judgments) when faced with emotionally
salient moral personal dilemmas (Carmona-Perera et al., 2012,
2013, 2014; Khemiri et al., 2012; but see Kornreich et al., 2013).
Moreover, by contrast to control participants, AD showed a
blunted emotional reactivity (estimated with heart rate response)
to moral personal dilemmas (Carmona-Perera et al., 2013). These
findings suggest that AD failed to engage emotional aversive
reactions within situations of social interactions that involve
personal moral violations for others.
Impaired social-decision making has also recently been
evidenced in AD through a measure of sensitivity to unfairness.
Indeed, a recent study (Brevers et al., 2013) has shown that, as
compared to healthy controls, ADs were more prone to reject
unfair offers during the ultimatum game (UG; Güth et al., 1982;
Sanfey et al., 2003). The context is very different from the studies
involving moral dilemmas, as in the UG paradigm, the subjects
are confronted with unfair situations directed toward themselves,
rather than involving other persons described in theoretical
stories. In the UG, two players (a proposer and a responder)
have to divide a sum of money in a single trial. If the responder
accepts the offer made by the proposer, the deal is validated. On
the other hand, if the responder rejects the offer, neither player
gets anything. According to rational economic agent, the only
way for the responder to maximize profits during the UG is to
always accept the offer (Haselhuhn and Mellers, 2005; Hewig
et al., 2011). Nevertheless, researchers have constantly observed
that individuals are unwilling to accept inequitable UG offers,
as compared to fair or medium-fair offers (Camerer and Thaler,
1995; Haselhuhn and Mellers, 2005; Knafo et al., 2008).
Findings from recent studies suggest that the rejection of unfair
UG offers is modulated by (negative) emotional processes. More
specifically, possible explanation for these seemingly “irrational”
rejection is that negative emotions, such as unfairness, might
drive participants to punish the proposer rather than making
an utilitarian choice (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Fehr and
Gächter, 2002). This assumption is in line with the theory of
altruistic punishment (Trivers, 1971; Fehr and Gächter, 2000,
2002), which advances that people are willing to punish non-
cooperators in order to enhance reciprocity in cooperation
transactions, even at personal costs to the punisher (as in the
case of rejecting an UG offer). Consistent with this theoretical
view, inequitable proposals were found to elicit a stronger neural
activation in emotion-related brain regions (Sanfey et al., 2003;
Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; Feng et al., 2014) and a greater-
magnitude of skin conductance response (SCR; van’t Wout et al.,
2006; Hewig et al., 2011; but see Osumi and Ohira, 2009).
Moreover, the proportion of rejected unfair UG offers is positively
associated with self-reported anger (Pillutla and Murnighan,
1996) and with greater SCR (Civai et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2013).
The present study aimed to examine the association between
emotional state and unfairness sensitivity in AD and healthy
controls while performing the UG. Emotional state was indexed
by skin conductance reactivity amplitude. Electrodermal response
is a valid measure of emotional activation (Bouscein, 1992; Canli
and Lesch, 2007), which has also been found to be sensitive to
the degree of unfairness associated with UG offers (van’t Wout
et al., 2006; Civai et al., 2010; Hewig et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2013).
We hypothesized that (i) AD reject unfair offers more frequently
than controls; (ii) in both AD and controls, facing unfair offers
will trigger higher SCR, as compared with medium-fair and fair
offers; (iii) AD exhibit higher SCR than controls when facing
unfair offers.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Recruitment
All subjects were adults. Demographics for the two groups are
presented in Table 1. All participants provided informed consent.
The study was fully approved by the Ethics Committee of the
BrugmannUniversity Hospital and conducted in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki. For the AD group, medical histories
were obtained by interview by a board-certified psychiatrist.
Twenty-six AD participants were recruited for this study from
the Alcohol Detoxification Unit of the Brugmann University
Hospital (Brussels). They were tested in their third week of
alcohol detoxification (i.e., the week before their detoxification
program end). They all received complete medical, neurological
and psychiatric examinations at the time of the selection.
AD participants were all diagnosed (made by PV and CH,
board-certified CHU-Brugmann psychiatrists) with alcohol
dependence according to DSM-V (American Psychiatric
TABLE 1 | Demographic data means and standard deviations for the
alcohol-dependents (ADs) and controls.
AD Control
N 26 32
Age (years) 42.53 (8.83) 41.25 (10.08)
Gender (male/female) 19/7 24/8
Education (years) 13.42 (3.17) 17.06 (3.14)****
Duration of alcohol abuse (years) 13.50 (10.99) –
Mean alcohol use (drinks/day) 15.03 (10.81) 1.96 (1.82)****
Number of prior hospitalizations 2.61 (2.51) –
for alcohol detoxification
Tobacco use (number of cigarettes per day) 24.15 (16.81) 3.43 (5.76)****
AUDIT 28.89 (5.20) 2.59 (3.87)****
BDI 10.96 (6.23) 3.56 (3.44)****
STAI-S 54.27 (12.25) 32.46 (14.02)****
STAI-T 42.61 (14.02) 30.03 (9.65)****
Values shown are the mean and standard deviation on each measure. AUDIT, Alcohol Use
Disorders Identification Test; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; STAI-S, State subscale of
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; STAI-T, Trait subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.
****t-test p < 0.0001.
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FIGURE 1 | Timeline for a single trial of the ultimatum game. The original screens were in French.
Association, 2013) criteria and confirmed by the Alcohol Use
Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders et al., 1993).
We excluded any subject who reported a lack of comprehension
of French language, or who had evidence of schizophrenia and
other psychotic disorders, bipolar disorders, polysubstance-
related disorders, pathological gambling and overt cognitive
dysfunction (based on DSM-V interviews, clinical observations,
and anamnestic information collected by PV and CH). Reasons
for exclusion were other current DSM–IV Axis I diagnoses, a
history of significant medical illness, head injury resulting in a
loss of consciousness for longer than 30 min that might have
affected the central nervous system, use of other psychotropic
drugs or substances that influence cognition and overt cognitive
dysfunction. Subjects were examined after they had abstained
from alcohol for a minimum of 18 days and at least 5 days
after a standard detoxification period. The detoxification
regimen consisted of B vitamins and decreasing doses of
sedative medication (diazepam). All received complete medical,
neurological, and psychiatric evaluations prior to enrolment in
the study.
Thirty-two control participants, similar for sex and age, were
recruited by word of mouth from healthy community members;
they were not paid for their participation. Exclusion criteria were
a present Axis I psychiatric diagnosis; substance-use disorder
during the year before enrollment in the study; or consumption of
more than four standard alcoholic drinks per day for longer than
1 month.
For each participant, current clinical status of depression and
anxiety levels were rated with the Beck Depression Inventory
(Beck et al., 1961) and the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI-S, STAI-T; Spielberger, 1983). Participants
completed the STAI-S just prior performing the UG task.
Task
Participants played as responders in a series of 54 single round
trials of the UG via computer interface. Before the game
started, participants were given detailed verbal explanations
and confirmed verbally that they understood the game. No
real monetary amount was awarded to the participants. At the
beginning of each trial, a white-colored, cross-shaped fixation
point was presented for 8000 ms in order to allow autonomic
activity from the previous trial to recover to baseline. Next, they
saw the amount of the stake and the amount proposed by the
partner for 10000 ms (see Figure 1). During this time, a picture
of the proposer’s face was displayed in the upper right of the
computer screen (see Figure 1). Then, a “response cue” was
displayed and participants indicated whether they accepted or
reject the offer by pressing one of two buttons (labeled “accept”
or “reject”) on a button box.
Photographs of 54 faces (27 male, 27 female, Caucasian, with a
neutral expression; taken fromBrevers et al., 2013) were randomly
matched with the offers. There were 18 fair offers (proposition
of 40, 45, or 50% of the stake to the responder), 18 medium-fair
offers (proposition of 27, 30, or 33% of the stake to the responder)
and 18 unfair offers (proposition of 17, 20, or 22% of the stake to
the responder). During each session, the order of the offers was
randomized.
Apparatus
The UG paradigm was programmed using E-prime 2.0
Professional (Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, PA,
USA). Electrodermal activity (EDA) was recorded during the
task using a BIOPAC MP150 (Biopac Systems, Santa Barbara,
CA, USA). The BIOPAC was connected to a stimulus delivery
computer and a second administrator computer running
AcqKnowledge v3.9.0. Events occurring on the stimulus delivery
computer were synchronized to the psychophysiology recording
using digital channels. EDA was measured using two grounded
Ag–AgCl electrodes (a BIOPAC TSD203 transducer with a
GSR100C amplifier module; gain = 5 V, low pass filter 1.0 Hz,
high pass filters DC), secured on the distal phalange of the
index and middle fingers of the non-dominant hand. Isotonic
paste (BIOPAC Gel 101, with recommended NaCl concentration
of 0.05 M) was used as the electrolyte. The EDA signal was
transformed into micro-Siemens units (mS) in Acqknowledge.
Data Preprocessing
Physiological data were analyzed offline in AcqKnowledge
(Biopac Systems, Santa Barbara, CA, USA). SCR amplitude was
defined as the change from the baseline to the peak of the response
started within a 0.5–4 s duration following offer onset. Behavioral
(mean proportion of acceptance) and physiological (mean SCR)
was not normally distributed, at each level of type of offers
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics of the proportion of offers accepted for
alcohol-dependent and control participants with unfair, medium fair, and
fair offers.
Percentiles
25th Median 75th
Controls Fair 0.77 100 100
Medium-fair 0.12 0.79 100
Unfair 0.08 0.50 100
Alcohol-dependent Fair 0.48 0.83 100
Medium-fair 0.17 0.33 0.58
Unfair 0.00 0.17 0.50
(fair, medium-fair, unfair) and for each decision type (accept vs.
reject). Attempts of log transformation (log [SCR + 1]) had no
significant effect on the normality of behavioral and physiological
data. Therefore, non-parametric statistical tests were performed
to analyze behavioral decision and SCR amplitude during the UG.
Results
Current Clinical Status
Independent samples t-tests revealed that AD participants had
lower scores of education, higher scores of depression, trait
anxiety and state anxiety (prior to testing). These results are shown
in Table 1. However, we found no correlation (Spearman rank)
between UG (behavioral and electrodermal) data and the scores
of education, depression, trait and state anxiety, for the whole
sample (N = 58), within the control (n = 32) or the alcohol
dependence group (n = 26). We observed no significant effect
of gender (for the whole sample and within the AD and control
groups separately) on UG (behavioral and electrodermal) data.
There was also no relationship between UG data in the AD group
and duration of consumption or mean consumption per day.
Behavioral Performances
A Friedman test was performed separately in each group in order
to examine the effect of the type of offers (fair vs. medium-
fair vs. unfair) on the proportion of acceptance (see Table 2,
for descriptive statistics). These analyses showed that there were
significant differences, in each group, between the fair and
the medium-fair offers (p < 0.0001), between the fair and the
unfair offers (p < 0.0001). In the control group, we found no
significant difference between the medium-fair and the unfair
offers, $2(1,32) = 0.69, p = 0.40. By contrast, in the alcohol
dependence group, there was a significant difference between the
medium-fair and the unfair offers [$2(1,26) = 4.00, p = 0.046],
indicating that AD participants reject more unfair offers than
medium fair offers.
Mann–Whitney U tests were then performed to examine
between-groups differences on the proportion of acceptance
according to the type of offers. There was a significant
difference between AD (Mean Rank = 24.35) and controls
(Mean Rank = 33.69) for the unfair offers (Mann–Whitney U
statistic = 282.00, Z =  2.132, p = 0.033), indicating that AD
decided to reject unfair offers more frequently than controls
(see Table 2, for descriptive statistics). There was no significant
difference between AD and control groups for the medium-fair
(Mann–Whitney U statistic= 306.50, Z= 1.741, p= 0.082) and
the fair offers (Mann–Whitney U statistic = 323.00, Z =  1.546,
p = 0.122). In addition, in order to estimate the interaction
between group and type of offers, Mann–Whitney U tests were
performed with scores computing the difference of acceptance
rate between each type of offers (i.e., unfair minus fair; unfair
minus medium-fair; medium-fair minus fair). These analyses did
not reach any significant results, all p> 0.05.
Skin Conductance Response
A Friedman test was performed separately in each group in order
to examine the effect of the type of offers (fair vs. medium-fair
vs. unfair) on SCR (in mS). These analyses showed no significant
SCR differences, in each group (all p > 0.05), between the fair
(control group: mean = 0.315, median = 0.254, 25th = 0.09,
75th = 0.42; alcohol group: mean = 0.41, median = 0.33,
25th = 0.138, 75th = 0.583), the medium-fair (control group:
mean = 0.296, median = 0.18, 25th = 0.10, 75th = 0.47;
alcohol group: mean = 0.288, median = 0.19, 25th = 0.008,
75th= 0.413) and the unfair offers (control group: mean= 0.292,
median = 0.33, 25th = 0.071, 75th = 0.45; alcohol group:
mean = 0.41, median = 0.33, 25th = 0.138, 75th = 0.583). We
then performed correlation analyses (Spearman Rho) between
SCR and proportion of acceptance, for each types of offer
and each group separately. These analyses showed that, in the
alcohol dependence group, proportion of acceptance is negatively
correlated with SCR for the unfair offers (Spearman Rho= 0.41,
p= 0.04; see Figure 2). This association did not reach significance
in the control group. We observed no significant correlation for
the fair and medium fair offers, in both control and AD groups.
Mann–Whitney U tests were then performed to examine
between-groups differences on SCR according to the type of
offers (fair, medium-fair, or unfair). These analyses showed
no significant difference between AD and controls (all
p > 0.05). Additional exploratory Mann–Whitney U tests
were performed to examine between-groups differences on SCR
according to decision types (accept or reject) for each type of
offers (fair, medium-fair, unfair). These analyses revealed a
significant difference between AD participants (n = 23; average
rank= 21.75) and controls (n= 20; average rank= 14.44) for the
rejection of the unfair offer (Mann–Whitney U statistic = 95.00,
Z =  2.07, p = 0.038), indicating that AD (mean = 0.488,
median = 0.445, 25th = 0.207, 75th = 0.589) exhibited a higher
SCR amplitude before rejecting unfair offers, as compared
to controls (mean = 0.28, median = 0.345, 25th = 0.075,
75th = 0.465). No other significant difference was observed.
Discussion
In the present study, we examined the association between
emotional state and unfairness sensitivity in recently abstinent
AD individuals and in healthy controls while performing an UG.
Emotional state wasmeasured by autonomic reactivity as reflected
by SCR.
At a behavioral level, AD rejected unfair offers more frequently
than controls, which replicate findings from the previous
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FIGURE 2 | In the alcohol-dependent group (n = 26), proportion of accepted unfair offers was negatively correlated with SCR amplitude triggered by
unfair offers (Spearman Rho =  0.41, p = 0.04).
UG study in alcohol-dependence (Brevers et al., 2013). At a
psychophysiological level, the proportion of accepted unfair UG
offers was negatively correlated with SCR, but in the AD group
only. Hence, deciding to accept or reject an unfair offer during the
UGwas influenced by emotional psychophysiological reactivity in
AD, but not in controls. In addition, AD exhibited higher SCR
than controls for unfair offers, but only prior to rejecting the
offer. Importantly, despite its statistical significance, the negative
correlation between ADs’ proportion of accepted unfair UG
offers and SCR remains moderate. In addition, between-groups
analyses did not include participants who accepted all unfair
offers (12 controls and three AD participants) and the number of
observations (e.g., rejected vs. accepted offers) differed for each
participants. Hence, current findings are preliminary and have to
be interpreted with caution.
Present findings suggest that, in AD: the higher the SCR,
the higher the rejection of unfair offers. Hence, because skin
conductance reflects sympathetic tone (Bouscein, 1992; van’t
Wout et al., 2006), the association between SCR changes and UG
rejection rates might reflect increased affective-arousal activity
when facing unfair UG offers in AD. In other words, present
results suggest that unfair offers triggered an emotional state in
ADs and, that as a consequence, they “punished” proposers by
rejecting the offer, thus depriving the proposer of their greater
share of the money (Nowak et al., 2000). By contrast, non-
alcoholics were better able to act as rational economic agents (at
both behavioral and psychophysiological levels) during the UG,
which results in maximizing their monetary profits. However, in
the present study, we used only one marker of emotional state
(i.e., SCR). Hence, we cannot exclude that UG offers did not
trigger significant emotional state in controls. In addition, present
data offers no information on the valence associated with the
SCR. Thus, we cannot infer that unfair offers triggered negative
emotional state in AD. In this context, one option for future
studies would be to make participants complete (after all trials
of the UG) a subjective ratings of the emotional valence (e.g.,
from 1/negative to 9/positive) that they had experienced in each
condition (i.e., fair, medium-fair, unfair) while playing the role of
responder (e.g., Hewig et al., 2011).
Importantly, contradictory to our hypotheses and
inconsistently with previous studies (van’t Wout et al., 2006;
Hewig et al., 2011; but see Osumi and Ohira, 2009), SCR was
not modulated by the degree of unfairness associated with UG
offers. Moreover, the absence of a significant correlation between
SCR and the proportion of accepted offers in control differs
from previous studies which showed that the rejection of unfair
UG offers is associated with greater SCR (Civai et al., 2010; Wu
et al., 2013). One explanation for these discrepancies is that
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participants recruited for the present study where older (i.e.,
adults with age ranging from 20 to 51 years) than participants
recruited in previous UG psychophysiological studies (i.e., young
adults with mean age ranging from 20.10 to 23.56 years; van’t
Wout et al., 2006; Osumi and Ohira, 2009; Civai et al., 2010;
Hewig et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2013). Indeed, multiple lines of
research have demonstrated that age is associated with lower
negative affectivity (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996). For instance,
laboratory studies demonstrated that age is associated with lower
negative experiential and physiological reactivity to laboratory
emotion inductions (Levenson, 2000; Tsai et al., 2000; Labouvie-
Vief et al., 2003). Hence, as compared to young adults, facing
unfair offers might have less emotional impact on middle-aged
adults, which could increase their level acceptance toward unequal
offers. Another possible explanation for these findings is that, in
the present study, no real money was awarded to the participants.
As a result, the use of hypothetical money could have lowered
participants’ emotional engagement during the UG task and
decreased the validity of the observed SCR. Hence, one direction
for future studies would be to examine the emotional correlates of
unfairness sensitivity in alcohol dependence through the use of an
experiential UG played with real money.
An implication of present findings is that AD might have
difficult to cope with unfair situations triggered by (e.g.) social
interactions. Nevertheless, additional studies are needed in order
to examine whether—emotional and behavioral—reactivity to
unfairness during the UG could predict relapse in abstinent
AD. Indeed, sensitivity to frustration has been reported to
impact alcohol consumption and relapse in abstinent AD patients
(Muraven et al., 2002; Baars et al., 2013; Winward et al.,
2014). Future studies should also examine psychophysiological
responses to UG offers in different subtypes of AD. For
instance, patientswith high interoceptive awareness are at elevated
risk of negative mood or stress-induced relapse (Wiens, 2005;
Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2012). As a result, these individuals
might exhibit increased emotional and behavioral reactivity to
unfairness during the UG. Indeed, it has been evidenced that
SCR responses is associated with UG offers’ rejection in people
with high interoceptive abilities but not in individuals with poor
interoceptive sensitivity (Dunn et al., 2012; see also Kirk et al.,
2011). It would be also interesting to examine whether Cloninger
Type 1—anxiety prone—alcoholism differ from Cloninger Type
2—impulsive—alcoholism at the UG. For instance, it has been
highlighted that people differing in levels of anxiety showed
distinct behavior patterns and autonomic neural responses during
the UG (i.e., SCR to inequitable offers was correlated with levels
of anxiety in individuals with high-trait anxiety, but not in the
individuals with low-trait anxiety), and that impulsivity might
be an additional moderating factors in UG offers acceptance
(Wu et al., 2013). Brain-imaging studies could also shed light on
specific processes underlying impaired social decision-making in
alcohol-dependence. For instance, insular activation plays a key
role in representing somatic states used to simulate the potential
negative consequences of an action (Damasio, 1994; Craig, 2002,
2009), such as when people reject unfair UG offers at substantial
cost to themselves (Sanfey et al., 2003; Grecucci et al., 2012; Harle
et al., 2012). Hence, it would be interesting to examine if increased
unfairness sensitivity in AD is underlined by increased insular
activation during the UG.
In sum, AD exhibited a lower rate of acceptation for unfair
offers during an UG task. Moreover, ADs’ tendency to accept
or reject unfair UG offers was associated with the level of
electrodermal response triggered by the offer. This association
was not found in control participants. These findings offer a first
evidence of hampered emotion regulation in alcohol dependence
when facing a social context of unfairness. Nevertheless, these
results remain preliminary and additional studies are needed in
order to further examine the impact of emotion on unfairness
sensitivity in AD.
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